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This paper expresses the author's critical uiew on certain prouisions
of the Arrest Conuention 1952 particularly in respect of lack of
uniformity in application of the Conuention's Rules by the Courts
in member countries, inconsistency in implementation of the
Rules into member countries' legislations, the position of
shipbuilders who haue been left out of the scope of the Conuention
arud open questions regarding jurisdiction.
The author also suggests that further discussion. on the subject
should take place in Croatia in order to initiate necessary
amendments to the Conuention and encourage a reuiew of
Croatian law and practics of arrest of ships.
CONSTRUCTION OF SHIPS - ARTICLE 1. PARAGRAPH L,
SUB-PARAGRAPH (1) AND ARTICLE 3, PARAGRAPH (e)
(i) Pursuant to the provision of Article 1, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph
(1) a claim which can be secured by the detention of a ship can be
a claim arising out of "construction, repair or equipment of any
ship...". Where the construction of a ship is concerned it is practically
only the builder or the buyer of the ship under construction who
can have such a claim which could be secured by detention of a
ship. Normally, when the ship is under construction there zue primarily
two parties which might have a claim against each other in respect
of such ship; it is the builder who construct and equip the vessel,
pursuant to the terms of the shipbuilding contract, on one side and
there is a buyer who has ordered the ship and who can have a
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claim against the builder in respect of such ship. In addition, varioussuppliers of equipment and malerials whose equipment and materialhave been installed in the vessel under construction may appear aspotential claimants and applicants for arrest of the vessel. However,I would primarily talk here about the arrest of a vessel as a judicalprocess to secure the shipbuilders maritime claim against the Luyer.(ii) The most common situation in worldwide shipbuilding practice is thatthe vessel during her construction until deliiery is iegally owned bythe shipbuilder, unless it has been agreed thai the vessel, althoughin the builders yard, is registered in the name of the buyer. If thebuilder, who owns the vessel under construction has a claim against
the buyer arising out of construction of the vessel, he cannot arrest
the particular vessel in respect of which the claim urose simply
because the vessel is owned by him and not by the buyer.
The builder will be neither able to arrest any other vessel owned by
the buyer, for two reasons; (a) pursuant to Article B, paragraph 1
of the Arrest Convention "... no ship, other than the particular ship
in respect of which the claim arose, may be arrested," in respect of
claims arising out of construction of the vessel; and (b) such other
ship would not be owned "by the person who was, at the time when
the maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular ship".
Strictly interpreting the provision of the Arrest Convention the
shipbuilder practically cannot enjoy the protection and security offered
by the Arrest Convention.
I have recently had a case in which the vessel was tendered for
delivery by the builder to the buyer, but the buyer has wrongfully
refused to take delivery of the vessel. The vessel was during construction
and at the time when the claim arose owned by the builder. Although
the buyer was a substantial shipowner and had many other vessels
registered in its name, the builder was not, for the above said reasons,
in a position to take action against any other ships owned by the
buyer in order to secure its claim which is presently in the court.
The application for arrest was made to the court in the jurisdiction
when another ship owned by the buyer was found taking cargo, but
the court has refused to grant arrest of such a ship on the basis
that the buyer, at the time when the shipbuilders claim arose, was
not the owner of the particular vessel in respect of which the claim
arose nor had it in its possession or control.
From this point of view, shipbuilders would be in a better position
if the vessel under construction was owned by the buyer. The builder
could then, when the claim from construction of that vessel arose,
arrest either the particular vessel or any other vessel owned by the
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buyer who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the
owner of the particular ship. This other option, often called "sister
ship arrest" would be available to the builder probably very rarely
as normally the buyer of the new buildings are "single ship companiej'
which do not have other vessels in their ownership.
(iii) If, however, the buyer has a claim against the builder which claim
arose out of construction of the vessel and if such vessel is owned.
by the shipyard the question is whether the buyer could arrest the
particular ship or any other ship owned by the builder at the time
when the buyers claim arose. This is an open question because it is
not yet clear whether the Arrest Convention, although in its title
refers to "seagoing ships", applies to vessels under construction or
not (see Dr Berlingieri on "Amest of Ships"; Lloyds of London Press
L992).
(iv) From the point of view of various suppliers of materials and equipment
for the vessel under construction the situation is even more complicated.
If the vessel in respect of which the supplier's claim arose is owned
by the builder then the supplier will be faced with the question
whether the provisions of the Arrest convention apply or not to the
vessel under construction (which is not seagoing ship); on the other
hand, if the vessel under construction is owned by the buyer the
suppliers could not, strictly speaking, take any action against such a
vessel because their claim normally arises out of a supply agreement
with the builder and not with the buyer. The supplier should not
be in a position to arrest the vessel which is not owned by the
debtor.
(v) The quoted provisions of the Arrest Convention were not created
with the purpose to secure the buyers' claims against the builders
in respect of the veseel under construction. In reality, the buyers
always insist on other types of security for their claims under the
shipbuilding contract such as refund guarantee or nondelivery risk
insurance or similar.
(vi) The idea behind the sub-paragraph (1) of the Article 1, paragraph
1 of the Arrest Convention was probably to secure the builders' and
suppliers' claims in respect of the particular ship under construction,
however for the reasons set out above the Convention has failed to
meet this purpose.
(vii) For the reasons given above I would suggest that the following
amendment is made to the Arrest Convention:
(1) in the last sentence of Article 3, paragraph 1 reference to ,"(1)"
to be deleted and the following paragraph be inserted after
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paragraph 1;
"An associated ship (being a ship owned, at the time when the
maritime claim arose, by the person who owned or ordered the
ship concerned) other than the ship in respect of which the
maritime claim arose, may be arrested in respect of maritime
claims enumerated in Article L, (1).''
DIFFERENCES IN APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE ARREST COI\IVENTION IN
DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES
Maritime lawyers - practitioners are very often facing various problems
and misunderstandings which appear almost at every action targeted to
arrest of ships in various jurisdictions. The problems such as the nature
of the claim itself, jurisdiction of the court to decide in merits, the
ownership over the vessel in question i.e. the relationship between the
debtor and the vessel the arrest of which is sought, countersecurity for
possible damages caused by the wrongful arrest of the vessel, etc often
appear primarily because certain provisions of the Arrest Convention have
not been unified in the states which have ratified it.
The mere fact that certain states have ratified the Arrest Convention
or adopted its provisions does not mean much in practice as whenever an
application for arrest of the vessel is made to the relevant court the
applicants are faced with the practice of lawyers and courts in the country
concerned and such practice very often either defers or is in contradiction
with the rules of the Arrest Convention. Now, a question arises whether
the Arrest convention itself should be reviewed or its member states should
actually review their own procedure, legislation and practice related to the
arrest of ships and unify them in accordance with the provisions of the
Arrest Convention.
I would like to mention only a few examples from practice:
(a) Our clients had a claim under a ship rep.air contract (Article 1,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (1)) and the particular ship in respect of
which the claim arose was found in Germany. We instructed our
correspondent lawyer in Hamburg to take the necessary steps in
order to arrest the vessel while she was in Hamburg. However, when
our German lawyer learnt that the shiprepair contract had an
arbitration cluse referring all disputes in merits between the parties
to the arbitration in Moscow and not in Germany, she advised us
that the German court would most likely refuse to arrest the vessel
as it obviously does not have jurisdiction to decide in merits.
Although Germany has ratified the Arrest Convention the described
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example of German court practice does not correspond with the
provisions of the Convention, especially not with Article T, paragraph
2.
(b) The client had the mortgage on the vessel in respect of which the
claim arose by the owners default in payment. On the clients request
we arrested the vessel in Argentina, however only after we have
deposited with the Argentinean competent court a counter security
in the amount equal to 30 Vo of the amount of claim and that deposit
was made as a condition for the court to consider our application
for the arrest of the vessel. This deposit was required as a security
for possible damages which might be caused to the owner and/or
bareboat charterer by the wrongful arrest of the vessel.
The counter security is not required by the Arrest Convention and
the quoted practice of the courts in Argentina is actually contrary
to the provisions of the Arrest Convention.
(c) When we have, on the clients instruction, intended to arrest a ship
which was not the one in respect of which the mortgage claim arose,
but another vessel owned by the same debtor, we have assumed that
would be difficult bearing in mind the provisions of the Article 3,
paragraph 1 of the Arrest Convention (pursuant to which claims
arising out of shipbuilding contracts and mortgages cannot be secured
by detention of any other vessel apart from the particular vessel in
respect of which the claim arose) and that the court in Genoa would
refuse to detain the vessel. However, Italian law does not make the
distinctions referred to in the said Article 3, paragraph 1 of the
Arrest Convention.
(d) In the case of the "Barenbels" decided by the High Court in London
(Queens Bench Division, Commercial Court) the port agent - creditor
has arrested m.v. "Barenbels" in the court of Umm Said, Qatar for
his claims against the previous owner of the vessel which claims
have arisen at the time when the vessel was owned by the debtor
before the title on the vessel was transferred to the new owner. The
High Court in London (Mr Justice Sheen) had heard the case on
appeal and decided that such a detention of the vessel would not be
allowed in England as the creditor has failed to take an action in
rem against the vessel whilst she was owned by the previous owner
- debtor. Pursuant to English law (Section 22 (4) of the supreme
court Act 1981) one of the conditions for arrest of a vessel, inter
alia, is that the person who would be liable on the claim in an
action in personam ("the relevant person") was, when the cause of
action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control
of the ship and that an action in rem may be brought in the High
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court against that ship, if at the time when the action is brought
the relevant person is either the beneficial owner of that ship or the
charterer of it under a charter by demise. In addition, any other
ship of which, at the time when the action is brought, the relevant
person (as defined above) is the beneficial owner, may be arrested.
The quoted provisions of the English law differ from the provisions
of Article 3 of the Arrest Convention in that (a) in addition to the
condition that "sister ship" can be arrested providing that she is
owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim
arose, the owner of the particular ship in respect of which the claim
arose, English law requires that an action in rem has been commenced
against the particular ship at the time when she was owned by the
person who would be liable in personam at the time when the
maritime claim arose; and (b) English law widens the meaning of
the word "debtor" or "the relevant person" by introducing, in addition
to the owner, persons who chartered the vessel, have the vessel in
their possession or in their control.
This is an obvious example how so called "unified" rules of the Arrest
Convention are in practice far away from the unity.
(e) On the other hand, in Turkey, which is not a member of the Arrest
Convention, however which laws recognise the civil code institute of
"Seize Conservatorie", every ship which is owned by the debtor can
be detained or arrested providing that the existence of debt has been
proved and that counter-security has been deposited with the local
bank in the amount equivalent to 10-15 Vo of the amount of the
claim. The counter security does not have to be actually deposited
but the same has to be arranged with the local bank who has to
undertake to the local court that on the request a letter of credit
shall be provided.
ARTICLE 3 OF THE ARREST CONVENTION AND ''CORPORATE
VEIL''
The provision of Article 3 of the Arest Convention pursuant to which
"a claimant may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which the
maritime claim arose, or any other ship which is owned by the person
who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the owner of the
particular ship" does not mean much in reality within the worldwide spread
concept of "single ship companies", expecially in Northern European
jurisdictions and the United States of America. It is practically unrealistic
to expect that "any other ship" shall be in the same ownership as the
particular ship in respect of which the claim arose although often the
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same interests lay behind the corporate bodies who appear as registered
owners of the particular ship and other ships. The actual interests in a
ship are covered by the corporate veil of limited liability and that veil is
normally never pierced by the courts in Northern European countries,
particularly in England.
The court practice of South Africa however is less reluctant to pierce
the corporate veil in the manner and in the circumstances as provided
for in South African Maritime Law 1983 (the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Regulation Act No. 105) particularly in the amendments of the law which
took place in 1992, especially in the Article 3, paragraph (7), subparagraph
(a) which reads as follows:
"For the purposes of sub-section 6 an associated ship means a ship,
other than the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose (i) owned
at the time when the action is commenced by the person who was the
owner of the ship concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose,
or (ii) owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person
who controlled the company which owned the ship concerned when the
maritime claim arose, or (iii) owned, at the time when the action is
commenced, by a company which is controlled by a person who owned
the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship
concerned, when the maritime claim arose."
The law further defines that ships shall be deemed to be owned by
the same persons if the majority in the number of, or of voting rights in
respect of, or the greater Pilt, in value, of, the shares in the ships are
owned by the same persons. A person shall be deemed to control a company
if he has power to control the company.
I would recommend that the Article 3 of the Arrest Convention be
amended so that the aspect of "corporate veil" be treated as shown above.
THE TIME BAR
The provision of the Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Arrest Convention,
as it is worded, is probably not enforceable in many jurisdictions because
if the ship, which was, at the time when the maritime elaim arose, owned
by the person who was at that time the owner of the particular ship in
respect of which the claim arose, has been sold to a third party before
the action in rem was commenced, such an action would be (in many, at
least, European jurisdictions) time barred. Maritirne claims, Iisted in Article
1, paragraph 1 of the Arrest Convention (if not all, then rnost of them)
do not create maritime liens and they do not foliow the vessel af'ter her
change of ownership. Many jurisdictions have adopted this additional
condition for the arrest of ships, which condition does not appear within
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the Rules of the Arrest Convention. The Rules do not require an action
to be commenced against the ship whilst she is stil owned by the same
person who owns the particular ship in respect of which the maritime
claim arose. In that respect, I would suggest that the actual practice of
maritime courts in most jurisdictions be adopted by the Arrest Convention.
Accordingly, I would suggest that the said additional condition be
incorporated in paragraph 1 and 4 of the Article 3 in a way that the
ship to which the maritime claim relates can be arrested if an action has
been commenced against such ship whilst she was in the ownership of
the person who would be liable for the claim in personam.
JI]RISDICTION
The long term "battle" between two oposite approaches to the question
on the jurisdiction in merits of the courts in the country swhere the arrest
has taken place, between Anglo Saxon approach on one side (that arrest
is a means of obtaining jurisdiction i.e. the courts of the country in which
the arrest is made should always have jurisdiction to determine the case
upon its merits) and the European Civil Code approach on the other side,
(that the arrest of a ship could not have the effect of attributing jurisdiction
to a court that did not have such jurisdiction on the basis of statutory
links) has resulted in a compromise embodied in Article 7 of the Arrest
Convention. Pursuant to that Article the courts of the country in which
the arrest was made shall have jurisdiction to decide the case upon its
merits if the domestic law of that country gives jurisdiction to such courts
or in other events listed from (a) to (f) in paragraph 1 of Article 7.
This "compromise" causes in practice a lot of uncertainty as to whether
the courts of the country in which the arrest was made will also have a
jurisdiction to decide in merits or not. This issue is very important from
the claimants point of view who might be in favour of certain jurisdiction
as far as the arrest is concerned however not necessarily when in favour
of the same jurisdiction the merits of the case is concerned.
Pursuat to sub-paragraph (0 paragraph 1 of /uticle 7, of the Arrest
Convention, the courts of the country where the ship was arrested upon
the claim which is secured by a mortgage of the ship concerned, would
have jurisdiction to decide the case upon its merits. In pracitce, however,
the claims secured by a mortgage on the ship are often evidenced by
promissory notes or bills of exchange which, inter alia, usually specify the
place of payment. The purpose of the debt being evidenced by a bill of
exchange or promissory note is to enable the claimant to obtain the
judgement in merits more easily and quickly upon presentation to the
court of a protested bill. The other benefit for the claimant is to sue the
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debtor in the country where the payment was to be effected (lex loci
solutionis) as there would be a reason to believe that in such jurisdiction
the defendant would have tangible assets. However the risk for the claimant
who wants to arrest the ship for its claim upon a mortgage is that the
country where the ship is arrested, and not where the payment under the
bill was to be effected, will have jurisdiction in merits.
Pursuat to paragraph 3 of Article 7 it is possible that the court within
whose jurisdiction the arrest was made would not have jurisdiction to
decide the case upon its merits if the parties (to the contract) have agreed
to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of a particular court other than
that within whose jurisdiction the aruest was made. However, as we have
seen from our "German example" that is not necessarily always the case.
In summarising the "compromise" offered by Article 7 of the convention,
the claimants who want to secure their claims by aruest of vessels, and
where there is no contractual provision on jurisdiction, have a lot of
problems in practice to make sure whether the court in the country in
which they want to arrest the vessel will also have a jurisdiction to decide
in merits and, if so, whether their determination of the case in merits
will be of advantage or disadvantage for the claimants. The claimants,
whose claims are secured by mortgages on the vessels, are especially facing
uncertainty in respect of jurisdiction upon the merits of their claim.
Furthermore, sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 1 and provision of paragraph
3 of Article 7 collide with each other as the mortgage agreement might
have a jurisdiction clause pursuant to which the parties have agreed to
submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of a particular court other than the
court within whose jurisdiction the arrest was made.
It is important to say that in practice all these problems are in one
way or another dealt with by instructing local lawyers in relevant jurisdictions,
obtaining their legal opinions up to the extent of reasonable certainty in
respect of the possible outcome of the arrest of the ship and, together
with the client, by deciding which steps and in which jurisdiction should
be taken, however, that is not the purpose of the Arrest Convention. The
purpose of the Arrest Convention is to unify all these practical differences
arising among the countries which have ratified the Convention and to
avoid such problems which are occurring in international maritime practice.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COI{VENTION
One of the main reasons for the practical problems appearing in the
international practice of arresting ships, as discussed above, is the
implementation of the Convention into various, most relevant shipping
jurisdictions. It is obvious that the Convention is not being implemented
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in all jurisdictions in the same way and hence the problems in relation
to interpretation of various provisions of the Convention, contradictions
between local laws and regulations on one side and the provisions of the
convention on the other different court practices in relevant jurisdictions,
etc.
For example, under Italian law there is practically no difference between
arresting a ship or arresting any other assets of the debtor, providing that
the claimat can prove to the court that there is the danger that his claim
when it becomes a judgement would not be enforceable without such a
measure. Therefore, a general rule is that if the debtor, owner of the
ship, is in good financial condition, arrest of the debtor's ship will not be
granted. Such a condition obviously does not come from the Convention,
however, it forms a part of Italian legal practice relating to a:rest of ships.
We had a case in which our client had a good shipbuilding claim against
a very reputable European shipowner. When one of the ships owned by
the shipowner/the debtor arrived Italy we were advised by Italian lawyers
that our application for arrest of the ship would not be successful unless
we proved (which in this case was extremely difficult) that the debtor was
in serious financial difficulties and that without arrest of their ship our
clients would be unable to enforce their judgement when it is made.
In the United Kingdom, however, the Convention has never been
implemented as law although the language of the Convention was practically
incorporated in the Supreme Court Act 1991 (Section 20-24). As we
discussed above, the said Supreme Court Act reduces actions in ren'L and
introduces some other additional conditions relating to the division between
actions ln relrl and actions in personarn.
Whilst under English law the claimant does not have any burden of
proving that the enforceability of his judgement against the debtor would
be questionable without the action in rent. under German law a claimant
has to prove to the court that the arrest is absolutely necessary in order
to enforce the future judgement. Although it seems that the bad financial
situation of the debtor is not efficient to persuade the court to grant the
application, it is not, however, clear what are the requirements for "necessity
of the arrest for the enforcement of future judgement".
At the end of this paper I would refer very briefly to the implemetation
of the Arrest Convention in Croatian law and practice.
Croatia is a member of the Arrest Convention and it has partly
incorporated certain provisions of the Convention into its Maritime Code
1994, however, like in many other jurisdictions, there are certain aspects
of Croatian law and practice which defer from the provisions of the
Convention itself.
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First example of this is contained in the Article g74 of the Maritime
Code L994 pursuant to which the arrest of ships, as an interlocktery order,is subject to conditions provided for in the general law on the enforcement
proceedings. General law on enforcement proceedings obviously contain
some conditions which do not form part of the Arrest Convention. This
is probaby in accordance with the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 6
of the Arrest Convention under which all matters of procedure which the
arrest may entail shall be covered by the law of the State in which the
arrest was made or applied for. However, croatian practice of arrest of
ships goes much further beyond "matters of procedure" and impose some
other conditions which give to the arrest procedure a very different
dimension altogether.
I would refer to two judgements made by the Commercial Court of
Croatia in Zagreb in 1992. The judgement number PZ-173-2 dated t4
February L992 in respect of the vessel "KOPER" the Commercial court in
Zagreb acting as a Court of Appeal has confirmed the ruIing of the first
degree Court refusing to grant the application for arrest of m.s. "KOPER"
on the grounds that the claimant failed to provide the evidence of the
existing debt and failed to persuade the court that there was a high risk
that without such measure the enforcement of the claim would be seriously
jeopardised and that such probability or risk must be subjective and proved.
In addition, it was held that because the debtor has its place of business
in the Republic of Croatia together with its bank accounts and other
assets, the removal of the vessel "KOPER" from the port of Rijeka would
not jeopardise the enforcement of the claimants judgement on the assets
which are placed within the Republic of Croatia.
These conditions do not appear from the arrest Convention and they
create dimension of "sisi conseryatori" which is quite common in most civil
Iaw jurisdictions. Under the Arrest Convention the burden of proof of
existence of debt is not on the claimant; the claimant has the right to
believe that he has a good claim in respect of which he wants the debtor's
ship arrested, however if he was wrong he would be liable for wrongful
arrest and consequently damages caused to the owner of the ship arrested.
(Article 3 may be arrested in respect of any of the maritime claims
enumerated in Article 1...").
The aspect of high risk that without the arrest the enforcement of the
claimants judgement would be seriously jeopardised does not form a part
of the Arrest Convention either. The arrest under the Convention means
the detention of a ship by judical process to secure a maritime claim,
regardless whether the future enforcement of the claimant's judgement is
jeopardised by certain debtor's actions. Practically speaking, the claimant
is not often in position to know whether the debtor is taking any actions
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in order to "seriously jeopardise" the enforcement of the claimant's judgement.
Furthermore, the fact that the Croatian debtor has its seat, its bank
accounts and other assets placed in the Republic of Croatia has nothing
to do with the Arrest Convention. The Arrest Convention is not interested
in any other assets owned by the debtor; it deals strictly with the detention
of a ship in order to secure a maritime claim. If the claimant believes
that he would better secure his maritime claim by taking action against
other debtors assets in the Republic of Croatica he would do so and the
provisions of the ship arrest legislation would obviously not apply.
The other judgement of the Commercial Court in Zagreb, acting as a
Court of Appeal, (judgement number PZ-29741-9L-2 of 10 March 1993)
also gives different light to the implementation of the Aruest Convention
in Croatian law and practice. The judgement is based, inter alia, on the
principle that if the claimants are foreign persons the Arrest Convention
1952 shall apply, which implies that if the claimants are Croatian citizens
then the Arrest Convention 1952 will not apply and, probably, only Maritime
Code t994 and general provisions of the Enforcement Proceedings Act will
apply. This is a little bit strange as the Arrest Convention itself suggests
that all matters of procedure shall be governed by the law of the State
in which the arrest was made. I do not see how the foreigners will arrest
a ship in Croatian waters in a different way and for different claims than
Croatian applicants.
This judgement goes further from seeking an evidence of high risk of
unsuccessful enforcement of the calimant's judgement: it assumes that if
a maritime claim relates to a ship which is registered in the Croatian
Ship Registry the risk of unsuccessful enforcement of claimant's judgements
does not exist. I have tried in this paper to emphasize the differences in
implementation of the Arrest Convention between several jurisdictions and
consequently differences in legislations and practice of arrest of ships in
several countries which are all members of the Arrest Convention. It is
obvious that apart from the definition "maritime claim" there is very little
in the Convention which has been uniformly accepted in its member states.
I am not, however, sure whether the Convention itself should be revised
or the laws on arrest of ships in particular jurisdictions would need revision
in order to accord with the rules of the Arrest Convention.
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MEDUNARODNA KONVENCIJA ZA IZJEDNAC,qVA,TA NEKIH PRAVILA O
PRIVREMENOM ZAUSTAVIJN{JU POMORSKIH BRODOVA IZ 1952.
(KONVENCIJA O ZAUSTAVIJAI\TJU: PREGLED PAJEDINIH ODREDABA
Ouaj rad izrai,aua a,utorou hritiiki pogled rla odredene odredbe Medunarodne
honuencije za izjednaiauanje nehih prauila o priuremenonl. zaustauljanju pomorskih
brodoua iz 1952. (Konuencija, o zaustauljanju). Posebnu pozornost pisac je obratio
na. nepostojanje jedinstuenosti u primjeni odredaba Konuencije od strane sudoua
zemalja ilanica, na nedosljednost u inkroporiranju odredaba u unutrainje
zahonodaustuo driaua ilanica, na poloiaj brodograditelja koji su ostali izuan primjene
Konuencije te na neka nerazjaienjena pitanja glede sudske nadleZnosti.
Pisac predlaZe da se raspraua o ouoj temi u Hruatshoj usmjeri na predlaganje
izmjena Konuencije i na poticanje pregleda hruatshog praua i prahse o materiji
zaustaulj anj a brodou a.
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